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TO OSCAR/UNIFORM SIERRA

C-R-E-T-SAVIN-SECTION FIVE OF SIX XXMMENPØ5-TBØ6Ø28 2/O/VCK-E/R41-67 ISHTAR SUPPLEMENT 2 AVC, KUS/AVIA-A, DOCT-A, INSE-A, OPER-M/E, I THIS REPORT CONTAINS ISHTAR MATERIAL THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM SIGINT-REFLECTED OPERATIONS AND POSTURE XXCC MIG-21.S KOREAN-PILOTED MIG-21.S OPERATED IN A FIGURE EIGHT PATTERN OVER KEP, EXTENDING AS FAR AS 50 NM TO THEEAST AND 40 NM NORTHWEST OF THE AIRFIELD (SEE APPENDIX 2). AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, ALL KOREAN PILOTS CURRENTLY ACTIVE IN THE DRV HERE ADMINISTRATIVELY' SUBORDINATE TO KEP. HONEVER, THIS SHOULD NOT IMPLY THAT THESE PILOTS REACTED ONLY FROM KEP AIRFIELD. FOLLOWING THE 24 OCTOBER 1967 STRIKES ON PHUC YEN, KOREAN-PILOTED MIG-21.5 WERE NOT NOTED ACTIVE AGAIN UNTIL 2 DECEMBER. ON THAT DATE, THREE OF THEM STAGED FROM PHUC YEN AND CONDUCTED ROUTINE TRAINING ACTIVITY THROUGH 11 DECEMBER FROM THAT AIRFIELD. THE 12 KOREAN MIG-21 PILOTS HOTED ACTIVE DURING DECEMBER HAD FLOWN A TOTAL OF AT LEAST 23 AREA FAMILIARIZATION AND PRACTICE GCI FLIGHTS BY 12 DECEMBER. ON 13 DECEMBER, THE MIG-21.S FLEW A DEFENSIVE PATROL FROM PHUC YEN AND RECOVERED AT KEP. FOR THE MIG-21.S FLEW A DEFENSIVE PATROL FROM PHUC YEN AND RECOVERED AT KEP. FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE MONTH, ALL KOREAN MIG-21 PILOTS FLEW EITHER FROM KEP OR PHUC YEN, WITH ALL ACTIVITY AND THE STAGING BASE DEPENDENT UPON THE PREVAIL- ING ENVIRONMENT AT EITHER OF THOSE AIRFIELDS. THE FIRST COMBAT DUTY PERFORMED BY THESE PILOTS IN DECEMBER TOOK PLACE ON THE 13TH, WHEN A FLIGHT OF TWO MIG-21.S AND FOUR MIG-17.S PERFORMED A JOINT DEFENSIVE PATROL IN THE AREA NORTHEAST OF KEP. THE PATTERN ESTABLISHED DURING THIS PATROL BECAME THE BASIS FOR ALMOST ALL SUBSEQUENT JOINT KOREAN MIG-21/MIG-17 DEFENSIVE PATROLS. THE MIG-21.S RANGED SUBSEQUENT JOINT KOREAN MIG-21/MIG-17 DEFENSIVE PATROLS. THE MIG-21.S RANGED FARTHER FROM THE AIRFIELD THAN DID THE MIG-17.S AND IT APPEARS THAT THEIR ROLE WAS, BASICALLY, TO INTERCEPT AND ATTACK, IN CONTRAST TO THE ROLE OF THE MIG-17.S, WHICH APPEARED TO BE AIRFIELD DEFENSE, WITH INTERCEPT ATTEMPTED ONLY WITHIN THE HOSTILE AIRCRAFT ENTERED THEIR SPHERE OF RESPONSI- BILITY. AT LEAST 28 DEFENSIVE PATROL SORTIES WERE FLOWN BY KOREAN-PILOTED MIG-21.S DURING DECEMBER. ONE OF THESE, ON 16 DECEMBER, RESULTED IN THE INITIAL KOREAN-PILOTED MIG-21 SHOOT- DOWN OF A U.S. F4 AIRCRAFT. (D) COORDINATED MIG-21/17 ACTIVITY AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED IN THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS ON MIG-21.S AND MIG-17.S***

RESPECTIVELY, PRIOR TO DECEMBER, MIG-21.S WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FORWARD AREAS OF THE DRY WHILE MIG-17.S REMAINED IN THE INTERIOR AREAS, CLOSE TO THE AIRFIELDS. HOWEVER, SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF MULTIPLE U.S. INGRESS ROUTES. AIRFIELDS. HOMEVER, SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF MULTIPLE U.S. INGRESS ROUTES,

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COORDI- NATED MIG-21 AND MIG-17 ATTACKS HAVE OCCURRED, WITH BOTH MIG-21.S AND MIG-17.S OPERATING IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA AT THE SAME TIME. THE FIRST OF SUCH ACTIVITY OBSERVED OCCURRED ON 14 DECEMBER WHEN A COORDINATED ATTACK BY MIG-21 AND MIG-17 AIRCRAFT WAS ATTEMPTED AGAINST USAF STRIKE FORCES USING MULTIPLE INGRESS ROUTES FROM LAOS. THIS ACTIVITY RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF A DRV MIG-17 TO A SAM SITE LOCATED WEST OF HANDI. SIGINT INDICATIONS SUGGEST THAT THE MIG LOSS MAS DUE TO THE FAILURE OF THE MIG.S IFF EQUIPMENT RATHER THAN THE COMPLEXITY OF THE COORDINATED ATTACK. THIS COORDINATED USE OF BOTH MIG-21 AND MIG-17 ATCRAFT IN THE FORWARD AREAS HAS EVOLVED, SINCE 14 DECEMBER, INTO A FIRM TACTIC WHICH CAN BE ANTICIPATED DURING MULTIPLE U.S. INGRESSES FROM LAOS. IN THIS EVENT, MIG-21.S ARE TARGETED AGAINST ONE FLIGHT, USUALLY THE ONE INGRESSING FURTHEST FROM THE HANDI/ PHUC YEN COMPLEX, WHILE THE MIG-17.S ARE TARGETED AGAINST A SECOND WHICH APPEARS TO BE THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE COMPLEX. VERTICAL MIG SEPARATION IS EMPLOYED, HITH THE MIG-17.S OPERATING NO HIGHER THAN APPROXIMATELY 9,800 FEET AND MIG-21.S FROM 13,000 FEET UPWARD. III. SAM OPERATIONS A. DRV SAM/AAA TACTICAL STUDY AND TRAINING PROGRAM ACCUMULATED SIGNIT DATA REVEAL THAT AN INTENSIVE TACTICAL EVALUATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM IS BEING CONDUCTED AT REGIMENT AND BATTALION LEVEL BY DRV SAM ELEMENTS, MITH DATA AND RESULTS FOR- MARDED TO "HIGHER ECHELON". ON 3 DECEMBER, EVIDENCE OF SOME RUSSIAN INTEREST WAS INDICATED WHEN A SPEAKER AT THE 236TH REGI- MENT, IN A VIETNAMESE LANGAUGE CONVERSATION CONTAINING SOME PHRASES IN RUSSIAN, INDICATED HE HAD SOME REPORTS TO MAKE OUT AND THAINING PROGRAMS SEEM INTERDEPENDENT, ALTHOUGH THE TRAILING PROGRAMS CONTAIN SUBJECTS WHICH DO NOT RELATE TO THE TACTICAL SITUATION. E.G., GOVERNMENT, MORALE, MILITARY TRAINING, ETC. DATA COLLECTED AT THE SAM FIRING BATTALIONS ARE FORWARDED TO REGIMENTAL LEVEL IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL IN FORMATION IS DELIVERED BY COURIER. XXHH 900 NININKLD

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